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In the United States, deposit insurance is an integral component of bank2
regulation. The Glass-Steagall Act3 introduced federal deposit insurance in the
wake of the 1929-33 banking crisis; that same act also separated commercial
1B.M., Louisiana State University, 1981; M.M., North Texas State University, 1983;
J.D., Florida State University, 1991; Associate, Foley & Lardner, Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
2 1n this article, the term "bank" refers to both banks and thrifts ("savings and loans"
or "S & Ls"). Generally, banks concentrate their investments in long-term commercial
loans while thrifts concentrate theirs in home mortgages. Thrift regulation and deposit
insurance are similar to that of banks, and the analysis in this paper applies to both types
of institutions. For a symposium on the much publicized savings and loan crisis and the
resulting deposit insurance catastrophe, see Symposium, Savings & Loan Crisis: Lessons
and a Look Ahead, 2 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 21 (1990).
3 Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89,48 Stat. 162 (codified as amended throughout 12 U.S.C.
chs. 2,3,6 (1988)).
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banking from securities-related activities and introduced other government
regulation. Since deposit insurance changes the incentives of banks and their
depositors, while simultaneously placing the associated risk on the
government, it is no surprise that deposit insurance has been coupled with
"hands-on" bank regulation from its inception.4
Of course, deposit insurance is only part of a broader scheme of bank
regulation. Bank chartering, on both the state and national level, is premised
on a theory of excess competition.5 Once entry is allowed, banks continue to
be supervised by regulators and are subject to capitalization requirements,
investment/activity restrictions, and affiliation/ownership restrictions. 6 To
further complicate matters, the United States has one of the most labyrinthine
regulatory systems imaginable: the Comptroller of the Currency supervises
national banks; the Federal Reserve supervises its member banks (all national
banks and some state banks); the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation has
the right to terminate insurance (which is required for national banks and
Federal Reserve member banks, and which is generally required for state banks
under state law 7) and certain other rights with respect to receivership
proceedings; and still more regulatory agencies exist for state banks and for
thrifts. 8
The purpose of this article, however, is not to summarize the maze of federal
and state banking regulation. Instead, recognizing that deposit insurance is a
centerpiece of the overall regulatory scheme to which any financial institution
in the United States is subject, this article is primarily concerned with subjecting
this form of bank regulation to analysis based upon general principles of
4 See, e.g., Gerald P. O'Driscoll, Jr., Deposit Insurance in Theory and Practice, in THE
FINANCIAL SERVICES REVOLUTION: POLICY DIRECTIONS FOR THE FUTURE at 165, 167
(Catherine England & Thomas Huertas eds. 1988).
SExcess competition theory claims to identify situations in which normal
marketplace competition leads to undesired results, and proposes to allow entry in those
situations only on a showing of "need." It differs from natural monopoly theory, which
is considerably less controversial, in that the situations so identified need not involve
the economies of scale associated with natural monopolies. See generally STEPHEN G.
BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 29-32 (1982). In banking regulation, excess
competition theory is reflected in the chartering process, which requires a showing that
the proposed bank's market needs another entrant, even if the proposed bank meets all
other requirements relating to capitalization, management, and so forth. See, e.g., 12
U.S.C. §§ 26, 27 (1988); Smith v. Smith, 431 F. Supp. 898 (W.D. Okla. 1977); WIs. STAT.
§ 221.01(5) (1992).
6 See generally Michael Klausner, An Economic Analysis of Bank Regulatory Reform: The
Financial Institutions Safety and Consumer Choice Act of 1991, 69 WASH. U.L. Q. 695,
699-705, 713-14 (1991).
7 New federal legislation will ultimately require all state banks to be federally
insured. FDIC Improvement Act of 1991, § 151(a), 105 Stat. 2236, 2282 (codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1811(e)); see H.R. REP. No. 330, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 105, 125, reprinted in 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1901, 1918, 1938.
8 See generally Klausner, supra note 6, at 695, 698-718.
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regulatory theory. This article is less concerned with the details of banking law
than it is with using regulatory theory to shape policy guidelines for the coming
process of deposit insurance reform.9
First, this article briefly examines the role of banks in an economy where
informational and other market conditions are perfect and where there is no
regulation of any kind; it concludes that under such unrealistic conditions
banks could function efficiently without regulation. It then relaxes the
assumption of perfect conditions and examines market-failure rationales for
banking regulation focusing on regulation designed around a system of deposit
insurance. In particular, this article attempts to articulate an information failure
theory to justify government regulation of banking.
Next, the article focuses on the regulatory costs of deposit insurance:
specifically, its adverse effects on the behavior of banks and depositors. The
article concludes that deposit insurance encourages banks to engage in
inefficient and risky behavior, that is, to assume risk even where the disutility
from doing so is greater than the risk premium earned (except for the
underpriced deposit insurance subsidy available from the government).
Section IV of this article examines proposals to reform federal deposit
insurance in the context of a new framework that broadly groups proposals
under five general theories of deposit insurance reform: "hands-on," "variable
premium," "market-based portfolio monitoring," "regulatory restraint," and
"segregation." My thesis is that, in general, each theory has something
beneficial to offer, and that ultimately, the different theories must be viewed as
complements to one another which can be worked into a comprehensive
reform proposal. The article concludes by offering a reform proposal which
calls for a political choice between retaining the overall architecture of the
existing deposit insurance system or abandoning that architecture in favor of
segregating or nationalizing banks which insure deposits. Finally, using the
theoretical framework developed in Section IV, the article makes suggestions
for tailoring reform to the above described political choices.
I. THE ROLE OF BANKS IN THE ECONOMY: HOW THEY WORK UNDER PERFECT
MARKET CONDITIONS
A. General Functions Which Banks Serve
A bank is a corporation into which shareholders invest money; the
corporation then proceeds to borrow from depositors and lend to borrowers.
Banks thus serve an important "go-between" function by "transforming the
denomination, maturity (or term to repricing), credit quality, and so forth of
the securities sold to lenders (i.e. depositors) and bought from borrowers (i.e.
commercial borrowers, home mortgagors, and so forth) and from assuming the
9 For discussions of the deposit insurance crisis and the extent thereof, see John L.
Douglas, Deposit Insurance Reforn, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 11 (1992); Charles E. Schumer
& J. Brian Graham, The Unfinished Business ofFIRREA, 2 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 68 (1990).
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associated risks."10 In other words, a bank's depositors may want to buy several
thousand dollars worth of short-term, low-risk debt with collateral services1l
in the form of an ordinary bank account, while the bank's borrowers may want
to sell several hundred thousand dollars worth of riskier long-term commercial
debt.
Banks assume some degree of risk incident to "transforming" maturity: for
example, if the bank sells demand 12 accounts to make 30-year fixed-rate loans
and interest rates rise, depositors will demand an interest hike or withdraw
their funds, while borrowers will be entitled to keep paying under the original
terms of their loans. The focus of this article, however, is on the more significant
risk assumption which occurs when depositors want a lower risk level than
that represented by the bank's portfolio of loans. Banks can reduce the risk seen
by depositors by injecting shareholder capital between depositors and
borrowers and writing deposit accounts as contractual obligations which are
not contingent upon actual portfolio performance. Thus, if the portfolio
performs poorly, depositors are still paid to the extent shareholder capital is
available for that purpose.13
Under perfect market conditions, banks could even go so far as to make
depositor accounts completely risk-free by injecting a layer of shareholder
capital equal to the amount of depositor claims. 14 However, doing this is the
functional equivalent of bank shareholders investing in the bank's portfolio for
their own account and depositors simply giving their money to the bank's
shareholders for safekeeping. Therefore, if depositors truly desire zero risk,
borrowers could just as easily borrow directly from the bank's shareholders
and depositors could simply place their funds with an institution that
specializes in the safekeeping of money and offers the collateral services
lOGeorge G. Kaufman, The Truth About Bank Runs, in THE FINANCIAL SERVICES
REVOLUTION at 9, 10 (Catherine England & Thomas Huertas eds. 1988).
11I use the term "collateral services" to describe check-writing privileges and other
services which banks offer in connection with deposit accounts. Throughout this article,
I refer to term, denomination, and collateral services as being the features of bank
deposits which prevent them from being fungible with other debt.
12"Demand" debt is debt which can be called for payment at any time by the lender
(the depositor in the case of a bank deposit). Such debt need not carry a corresponding
right of the borrower to pay at any time. Thus, the demand feature is not simply a
function of term, but is actually a call option held by the lender.
131n this respect, a depositor is like any other ordinary unsecured creditor, who can
seek claim satisfaction not only out of assets which the debtor purchased with loan
proceeds but also out of any other unencumbered, nonexempt assets of the debtor. The
analogy between bank depositors and other unsecured creditors is further developed
infra at note 36.
14As the text suggests, this is true only under unrealistically ideal conditions: where
depositors have perfect information about shareholder capitalization, where depositors
can be certain that this capital will not be withdrawn, where there will be no transaction
costs associated with settlement of depositor claims, and so forth. The simplification in
the text is for illustration only.
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presently associated with bank deposits; there need be no connection between
the two. Banks serve an important risk-assuming function, however, so long
as depositors desire a risk level that is greater than zero (with its
correspondingly higher return) but lower than the risk represented by the
ultimate users of depositors' funds.
B. A Closer Examination of the Risk Assumption Function
The risk premium paid by the banks' borrowers will inure to the banks rather
than their depositors to the extent banks assume risk incident to their
operations.15 In this regard, then, the risk-assumption aspect of banking
appears quite similar to any other type of leveraged investment, such as issuing
junk bonds to make speculative equity investments.
The principle of leveraged investment can be illustrated by a grossly
oversimplified example. Assume there is an investor (the "leveragor") to whom
any loan would be completely risk-free; also assume that all actors are
completely risk-neutral; finally, ignore the existence of all transaction costs.
Suppose the leveragor has the opportunity to make an investment which will
pay off instantaneously 16 but which has three possible outcomes, each with a
one-third chance of occurring. The investment may pay $2,000, or $1,000, or it
may pay nothing. The investment has an expected value of $1,000,17 and since
the market is risk-neutral, investors should price the investment at $1,000.
Suppose the leveragor now borrows $1,000 by selling a promise to
immediately repay $1,000 regardless of the outcome of the investment. Since
all investors are risk-neutral and the debt matures instantaneously, and since
debt sold by this particular leveragor is completely risk-free, this promise will
sell for $1,000. Then suppose the leveragor uses this $1,000 to buy the
investment being leveraged. Two possible outcomes must be computed: one
for the leveragor and one for the investor who lends the $1,000 to the leveragor
(the "lender"). The lender will receive $1,000 regardless of how the investment
pays. The leveragor will lose $1,000 if the investment pays nothing (because of
the payment on the debt to the lender), or break even if the investment pays
$1,000, or make a profit of $1,000 if the investment pays $2,000. Consequently,
the lender sees an expected value of $1,000 while the leveragor sees an expected
value of zero, but the lender's investment is risk-free while the leveragor's
investment is not.18
15 Banks also profit by charging for the services they provide as intermediaries
between depositors and borrowers and for collateral services such as check-writing
privileges.
16 This simplifies the illustration by eliminating the need to consider the time-value
aspect of the investment.
17Expected value is computed by multiplying each possible outcome by the
probability of its occurring and adding the results: (1/3 times $2,000) plus (1/3 times
$1,000) plus (1/3 times 0) equals $1,000.
18As pointed out earlier, this oversimplified illustration of leverage is likely to be of
little utility in the real world, even without relaxing the assumptions in the hypothetical.
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In reality, the market will reflect that most investors are risk-averse and
charge a premium for assuming risk. Thus, each unit of this particular
investment sells for less than $1,000, while the lender still pays $1,000 for the
leveragor's debt as long as it is completely risk-free. The difference reflects the
risk premium earned by the risk-assuming leveragor. Leveragors will only
assume risk where the risk premium is greater than their individual disutility
from assuming that risk, while lenders will prefer this arrangement to a direct
investment only where their individual utility from avoiding risk is greater
than the sacrificed risk premium.19 Thus, both the leveragor and lender can
profit from the proper risk allocation where the leveragor is less risk-averse
than the lender.
As the leveragor becomes more judgment-proof or contracts for limited
liability, two phenomena occur. First, risk shifts from the leveragor to the
lender, who expects an appropriate risk premium. Second, "expected value" is
transferred to the leveragor, so that even a risk-neutral lender will no longer
pay $1,000 for the leveragor's promise since that is no longer its expected value,
causing the "debt" to look more and more like equity.20 Still, as long as the
leveragor has collectable personal liability2' of greater than zero, the leveragor
continues to be assuming greater risk than the lender and greater risk than with
no leverage at all.
Investors usually leverage for two reasons. First, leverage is a method of
increasing risk to the level desired by a particular investor. Although under
perfect conditions risk premiums should move to an equilibrium at which the
market price completely compensates for any level of risk, individuals have
differing levels of risk aversion and will prefer to invest at different risk levels.
The possibility of leveraging almost any investment available in the
marketplace increases the number of real investment alternatives available,
For the leveragor's debt to be truly risk free, the leveragor must have $1,000 of his or
her own assets unconditionally available to repay the lender. Thus, the arrangement is
functionally indistinguishable from a direct investment by the leveragor, with thelender
simply depositing the $1,000 loan with the leveragor for safekeeping. See supra text
accompanying note 14.
19Individual risk preferences will vary greatly, even in a perfect market where risk
premiums are perfectly matched to market risk preferences.
20To illustrate, assume that the leveragor will not repay the $1,000 debt except out
of the proceeds of the investment. Now if the investment pays zero, both leveragor and
lender will receive nothing. If the investment pays $1,000, the leveragor will repay the$1,000 and keep nothing. If the investment pays $2,000, the leveragor will pay $1,000
and keep $1,000. This yields an expected value of $1,000/3 to the leveragor and $2,000/3
to the lender, so that even a risk-neutral lender will pay considerably less than $1,000
for leveragor's promise. Instead of discounting the promise, the lender might demand
an entitlement to $2,000 should the investmentpay $2,000. In that case, the lenderwould
in effect be investing directly without leverage, and the "leveragor" would merely be an
intermediary.
21This would include any personal assets that the leveragor places inside a
limited-liability entity.
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and thus, enables investors to more efficiently implement their true
preferences. 22 Second, where an investor has discovered information not yet
reflected in market prices, leverage is a way to maximize the gain from trading
on this information. In other words, an investor, who discovers that in the
above situation the probabilities given are erroneous and that each unit of the
investment actually has a 100 percent chance of paying $2,000, should borrow
as much as possible to the extent units of the investment are available.
23
Banks typically leverage for the first reason: bank leverage generally reflects
the fact that banks are serving their intermediary function by assuming some
portfolio risk so that depositor risk is lowered to the level desired by depositors.
Thus, banks serve an important economic function by transferring risk (and
the associated risk premium) from more risk-averse depositors to less
risk-averse bank shareholders. 24 But banks, seeking to maximize profits, will
respond to perverse incentives to over-leverage as would any other investor.
Therefore, to the extent government regulation introduces such incentives,
inefficiency will result. Accordingly, government regulation should be avoided
except where a sound theoretical justification for regulation exists, and
regulatory designers must watch for and counteract any perverse incentives
which regulation creates.
II. RATIONALES FOR GOVERNMENT REGULATION
As indicated above, sound regulatory theory requires a showing that banks
cannot function effectively in an unregulated environment before regulation is
imposed. Moreover, this article is specifically concerned with justifying a
regulatory scheme designed around deposit insurance. Traditionally, the
rationale for deposit insurance has been that banks are peculiarly susceptible
to "runs," and that the role of banks in the economy is such that runs are
particularly devastating to the macro-economy. While this article contends that
the traditional justification has not been well-articulated and is based on
inherently unsound assumptions, my central purpose is not to debunk or indict
the traditional view but rather to rearticulate it in a simpler and more coherent
2 21n essence, net social efficiency is increased because risk is shifted from the more
risk-averse lender to the less risk-averse leveraging investor, just as shifting risk from a
risk-averse individual to a less risk-averse insurance company would create efficiency
gains. In reality, however, efficiency gains from insurance probably result less from the
fact that the insurer is necessarily less risk-averse than the insured than from the fact
that the insurer sees less actual risk because of statistical convergence to the mean
resulting from large numbers. See generally ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND
ECONOMICs 65 & n.22 (1988).
23This would seem to be at odds with the assumption of perfect market conditions,
but in fact, such conditions result (or nearly result) only because of market professionals
who engage in exactly such behavior.
241f shareholders are so risk-averse that they desire zero risk, banks can transfer all
risk to shareholders, thereby serving as institutions that specialize in the safekeeping of
funds and offer collateral services in relation to depositors. Seesupra text accompanying
note 14.
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form. Thus, the traditional view will be examined before my own theory is
offered.
A. The Bank Run Rationale
The traditional rationale for insurance-based regulation focuses on bank
runs.25 Bank runs may occur because debt securities sold by financial
institutions--deposits-are either demand or very short term. This enables
depositors to withdraw their funds when they believe that deposits are not
paying a sufficient rate of return (or within a very short time thereafter).
Further, if the rate of return is indeed insufficient, the first depositors to arrive
at the bank and withdraw deposited funds, by receiving their full claim without
discount for the low rate of return, are receiving more than their claim is worth,
so that later depositors will receive correspondingly less. Thus, there is a strong
incentive to be one of the first depositors to get to the bank and withdraw funds,
and a run results.26
Bank runs may be ordinary market corrective forces if they are based on
accurate information that suggests rational depositors should withdraw their
funds, taking into consideration the rate of return that the deposit pays. In such
a case, "the run is the result of the insolvency, not the cause.' 27 That is, a solvent
bank could thwart the run by increasing the return paid on deposits to a level
appropriate to the riskiness of its portfolio. Alternatively, the bank could
decrease depositor risk to an appropriate level by accommodating the run: As
portfolio assets are liquidated and used to retire outstanding debt to depositors,
the bank's debt-to-equity ratio will drop and depositors who have not
withdrawn funds will see a decreased level of risk; eventually this risk will be
appropriate to the return the remaining depositors are receiving. If all assets
are liquidated before this point is reached, then the bank's assets are insufficient
to cover its liabilities--that is, the bank is insolvent.28 This is what George
2 5Kenneth E. Scott, Deposit Insurance and Bank Regulation: The Policy Choices, 44 Bus.
LAw. 907,910 (1989); see also Kaufman, supra note 10; Bert Ely, The Big Bust: The 1930-33
Banking Collapse-Its Causes, Its Lessons, in THE FINANCIAL SERvICES REVOLUTION: POLICY
DIRECTION FOR THE FUTURE at 41 (Catherine England & Thomas Huertas eds. 1988).
26See Kaufman, supra note 10, at 10-11.
2 71d. at 13. On the other hand, runs at insolvent banks would result in wealth transfers
from "slow" depositors to "fast" ones, since the first depositors to the bank receive full
payment while later depositors receive nothing. These wealth transfers might be seen
as unfair. Further, even if depositors were subject to bankruptcy-type preference law,
see 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1988), the power of a trustee to recover so many small payments
scattered among so many "shallow pockets" who have probably consumed theproceeds
would be virtually worthless. To the extent deposit insurance can be justified on other
grounds, an incidental effect would be equitable treatment of all depositors, fast and
slow alike.
28 0f course, this ignores transactional costs associated with liquidating assets, but if
those are too great, a solvent bank could simply pursue the alternative of increasing the
return paid on deposits so as to thwart the run.
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Kaufman means when he says that runs result from insolvency rather than vice
versa.
29
Because of post-Depression uneasiness, the traditional bank run rationale
for deposit insurance may have been premised on the proposition that even
runs on insolvent banks are harmful. Alternatively, the rationale may have been
premised on perceived informational defects in the financial services market
indicating that most runs were not based on accurate perceptions of a bank's
financial condition. In particular, Congress may have been reacting to the
likelihood that even runs based on accurate information might cause panic
which in turn could trigger runs based on inaccurate information.
The anti-regulatory response to the argument that bank runs may not be
based on accurate information has been to acknowledge that runs based on
inaccurate information could theoretically create transactional costs because of
the need to liquidate assets, with further transactional costs imposed on society
at large because liquidation takes place at "fire sale"30 prices which do not move
resources directly to the highest-valuing user.31 However, banks operate
through a system of correspondent banks and central banks with the
government ultimately being the lender of last resort; other banks and the
government are likely to have better information than depositors. Thus,
assuming that running depositors place withdrawn funds in other bank
accounts or government securities,32 as opposed to stuffing the funds in
mattresses,33 healthy banks or the government can make deposits in, advance
29 See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
30A fire sale is any sort of forced sale which brings a greatly depressed sales price.
A sheriff's auction is the classic example of a fire sale.
31 Also, because of depressed fire sale prices and transactional costs incurred by the
bank experiencing the run, such runs cause wealth transfers from banks to asset
purchasers and service providers that might be seen as unfair. See supra note 27. Such
wealth transfers can eventually lead to "real" insolvency of the bank experiencing the
run.
32 Running depositors could make other types of investments as well, but those
would have a similar effect of getting the funds back into the economy. For example, if
running depositors tended to invest in corporate securities, commercial bank debt might
decline, or the corporate cost of capital might decline to the point that corporations find
it profitable to borrow beyond their current needs and increase their bank deposits or
other investments.
Some running depositors might decide that the costs of identifying an alternative
investment are too great and that they should therefore spend the withdrawn funds on
increased consumption. This would decrease funds available for capital investment.
However, the extent of such increased consumption is not likely to be great since the
depositor originally earmarked the withdrawn funds for savings rather than
consumption.
33
"Mattress stuffing" is an informal term used to describe a system-wide run to
currency. Where depositors run to currency or consumption, deposit insurance is
unlikely to thwart the run in any event. Since running depositors prefer consumption
or currency to government securities, they may also prefer these investments to
government-insured bank deposits. It is possible (though unlikely) that this will not be
9Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1994
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credit to, or buy assets of the bank experiencing the run. If so, transactional
costs could be quite low and fire-sale losses almost nonexistent. Thus, the
argument goes, if depositors run to other banks or other non-currency
investments, and if banks and the government have good information and
behave rationally, bank runs probably do not seriously threaten either
particular institutions or the system as a whole.34
Both the traditional theory and the anti-regulatory response have something
to offer, but both are also somewhat off the mark. The traditional theory has
identified an important information defect that justifies regulation, but is
overstated in concluding that this defect will necessarily lead to bank runs that
spiral out of control and lead to total system-wide economic collapse rather
than simply resulting in allocational inefficiencies which may still justify
regulation. Conversely, the anti-regulatory response offers a valid criticism of
the traditional theory, but overlooks an important point. Even though running
depositors may place their funds someplace else in the economy, thereby
thwarting a total macro-economic breakdown, they have by definition placed
their funds someplace other than they would have had they had perfect
information. Thus, misallocation of resources is clearly present, and regulation
may be justified.
My other criticism of the traditional theory is that it is somewhat lacking in
coherence, since it identifies bank runs as a justification for deposit insurance
and then justifies hands-on bank regulation as necessary to protect the
government's interests as deposit guarantor. Certainly, deposit insurance does
create an additional need for hands-on regulation. However, in my view, a
more coherent theory would first identify the market defect that justifies
regulation, and then design a regulatory scheme that addresses that defect,
explaining the role that deposit insurance (or, for that matter, any other
element) plays in that design. Given the focus of this article, the theory offered
in the next section seeks to identify a market defect that justifies regulation built
around deposit insurance.
B. Inadequate Information: A Mainstrean Theory
1. Restating the Information Problem
There is no question that banks cannot function effectively in an unregulated
environment. Clearly a market defect exists, and clearly that defect is an
informational one. The banking industry is characterized by enormous barriers
true, since government securities are not completely fungible with insured bank
deposits, being different in term, denomination, and collateral services provided by the
issuer.
3 4Kaufman, supra note 10, at 10-15, 25. Bert Ely explores the tendency to run to
currency during deflationary periods in Ely, supra note 25. When deflation is occurring,
the zero percent yield of currency is a positive economic rate of return which may in
fact be higher than the return on other investments, so that currency becomes more
attractive.
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to effective depositor monitoring. Depositors will have great difficulty
determining whether a bank's portfolio actually contains the degree of risk for
which they are bargaining. Depositors might try to bargain with institutions
for the level of risk they desire: If depositors want a risk-free investment, they
will accept a risk-free rate of return.35 However, they might find that after the
transaction is complete, they have absolutely no idea whether the investment
sold to them truly contains the level of risk it has been represented to contain.
Furthermore, even if the portfolio could be effectively assessed before the
depositor and bank contract for a particular rate of return, without ongoing
monitoring, the bank will have strong incentives to remove shareholder capital
or increase the riskiness of the portfolio.36
Essentially, this market imperfection means that the market will tend to force
excess risk on depositors. Depositors will have difficulty evaluating the risk
they are assuming by placing their funds with the bank, the market will
encourage the bank to subsequently increase that risk without compensating
the depositor, and information barriers will prevent depositors from effectively
counteracting the bank's attempts to do so. The information problem with
banks is no different from informational problems in other markets, such as
legal or medical services, drug manufacturing, or securities, which prevent
goods from being optimally priced so that the market will insure the efficient
allocation of those goods.3 7
35Depositors will actually accept a slightly lower rate of return because of the utility
they derive from collateral services such as check-writing privileges.
3 6As shown earlier, removing shareholder capital not only increases the risk of the
depositor's investment but actually transfers some of its risk-unadjusted expected value
to shareholders. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
The problems confronting depositors also confront other unsecured creditors to
some degree. See supra note 13. Corporate bondholders are generally not protected
against distributions to shareholders until the corporation is insolvent (unless such
protection is contracted for). See, e.g., REV. MODEL BUSINESs CORP. ACT § 6.40 (1984).
Ordinary unsecured creditors are usually not protected by fraudulent transfer law or
bankruptcy preference law until a debtor is insolvent. See, e.g., UNIFORM FRAUDULENT
CONVEYANCES ACT (1918); UNIFORM FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT (1984); 11 U.S.C. §
544(b) (1988) (enforcement of state fraudulent transfer law by bankruptcy trustee); 11
U.S.C. § 548 (1988) (bankruptcy fraudulent transfer law); 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1988)
(bankruptcy preference law). Such creditors may be better able to monitor and
contractually constrain debtor activity than bank depositors, or they may seek
"security": a prioritized claim on a specific asset of the debtor for satisfaction of the
secured debt. See generally U.C.C. art. 9 (1989). Bond indentures are similar.
37This problem occurs regardless of what risk level depositors desire. Whatever that
risk level is, accounts may be riskier than depositors realize and the bank will later try
to move the risk level even higher. Notice, however, that the risk level desired by less
wealthy depositors is likely to be quite low. Individuals have a fairly inelastic demand
for the features which prevent bank deposits from being fungible with other debt
instruments: they need a certain amount of funds in demand accounts, preferably with
check-writing privileges and penny denominations. Whatever this inelastic demand is,
the poorer an individual is, the greater the percentage of total wealth that such demand
will represent. (In other words, wealthier individuals keep a smaller percentage of their
total wealth in checking and savings accounts than do less wealthy individuals.) These
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By identifying information problems as the theoretical basis for imposing
regulation, a truly coherent theory can be developed which accommodates
traditional arguments for bank regulation. The information defect is the same
as that identified in the bank run theory, but my theory asserts that imperfect
information leads to inefficient allocation of resources even where bank runs
do not occur. The concern for the role that banks and the payments system play
in the macro-economy is consistent with my theory because the need for safe
demand deposits and a check-processing system are factors influencing
societal demand for a given product (bank deposits) which information
problems prevent from being efficiently delivered.
Additionally, by focusing on inadequate information, bank regulation can
be premised on less controversial grounds and theoretical discussion can
proceed to meaningful analysis of other issues. Indeed, Supreme Court Justice
Stephen Breyer has called inadequate information the "classic rationale' for
regulation, and he observes that criticisms of information-based regulatory
schemes do not generally dispute that inadequate information justifies
regulation but rather are concerned with whether an information defect
actually exists and whether the proffered regulatory solution addresses the
problem in a cost-effective manner.38
In the context of deposit insurance, anti-regulatory criticisms are more likely
to be of the second type; that is, opponents of deposit insurance may concede
that information barriers are present, and perhaps even that some regulation
is justified, but opponents will argue that deposit insurance is not necessary to
correct the informational problems and that it causes more problems than it
solves. There will never be universal consensus about whether deposit
insurance efficiently corrects informational problems, but a plausible
information-based justification for deposit insurance can be made. A closer
examination of regulatory responses to information barriers is required to
develop this point.
2. Regulatory Responses to Information Barriers: A Closer Look
Under my theory, information defects with respect to given markets fall into
three broad classifications. The first type is information that is not readily
obtainable but, once obtained, is easy to understand. A good example of this
type of information defect occurs with respect to pharmaceuticals. While the
consumer faces enormous barriers to gathering information about the efficacy
and side effects of a given drug, there is little difficulty in processing that
information once obtained. Therefore, regulatory approval procedures and
labeling requirements are sufficient regulation in this context; once consumers
have reliable information that the drug does indeed offer a cure but has certain
less wealthy depositors are likely to be highly risk-averse with respect to the funds in
deposit accounts.
38BREYER, supra note 5, at 26-28.
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side effects (for example, makes users see green spots before their eyes), they
can make their own decision as to whether the cure is worse than the disease.
The second type of informational defect involves information which is both
difficult to obtain and difficult to process once obtained, but which can be
processed by others whose actions will be reflected in the market in question.
The quintessential example of regulation aimed at this type of information
defect is securities regulation. The typical investor can neither individually
obtain the type of information required to be contained in a registration
statement or other securities document nor process that information in any
meaningful way. However, since all securities of a given issue are fungible and
traded on an active market, market professionals will trade the securities to
their optimal price and other investors can purchase equivalent securities at
the same price.
The information defect present with respect to bank deposits is of the third
type. Information with respect to the capitalization and other financial aspects
of a given bank is difficult to obtain and is incomprehensible to the average
depositor. Further, while the bank will have some sophisticated depositors
such as institutional depositors, there is no active market to guarantee that
other depositors will benefit from their expertise. Indeed, even if regulation
were to require all deposits to be offered on the same terms, there is no
guarantee that individual and institutional deposits are similar enough to be
considered fungible; at the very least, denomination will vary considerably.
This information defect present in banking justifies going beyond disclosure
to hands-on regulation at the least, and indeed to deposit insurance as well.
Hands-on regulation can be effective in assuring that bank deposits offer the
level of risk that depositors want, but it may be ineffective in communicating
this fact to depositors. Such a condition is not an improvement, since the flow
of information to depositors is the goal of bank regulation under my theory.
With deposit insurance, depositors know that bank deposits are as secure as
government securities. Thus, there is no question that deposit insurance
corrects the perceived information problem. 39 The question then becomes
whether deposit insurance causes more problems than it solves.
III. COSTS OF DEPOSIT INSURANCE: INEFFICIENT ALLOCATION OF RISK
ASSuMPTION
The principal cost of imposing regulation built around deposit insurance on
the banking industry is inefficient allocation of risk assumption; that is, deposit
insurance leads to some risk assumption which would not occur in the free
market because the risk premium earned (before subsidization) is less than the
39 To develop a point made earlier, deposit insurance essentially assumes that
deposits desire zero risk, and that therefore the bank's role in relation to the depositor
is to provide for the safekeeping of funds with collateral services. Perfectly priced
deposit insurance should place shareholders in the same position as unleveraged
investment. See supra text accompanying note 14.
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disutility incurred from assuming the risk.40 This cost can be conveniently
illustrated by returning to the hypothetical used earlier in this article.
In that hypothetical, we considered a "leveragor" who borrows money to
make an investment which has equal probabilities of paying zero, $1,000, or
$2,000. We also discussed how the economics of the transaction would vary if
the leveragor's obligation to repay the lender were not completely risk-free to
the lender.41 Suppose that the leveragor has only $500 of personal assets, after
collection costs, from which the lender can be paid.42 If the leveragor sells a
promise to pay $1,250 secured by the investment being leveraged, the lender
will see a two-thirds chance of receiving $1,250 and a one-third chance of
receiving $500. The lender thus sees an expected value of only $1,000 and will
pay only $1,000 even if risk-neutral. If the leveragor uses that $1,000 to buy the
investment being leveraged, the leveragor sees a one-third chance of losing
$500,43 a one-third chance of losing $250, and a one-third chance of gaining
$750. The leveragor would thus see a risk-unadjusted expected value of zero.
When risk aversion is factored in, the investment sells for less than $1,000.
The leveragor thus sees an expected value greater than zero even though none
of his or her own money is at stake: the leveragor has earned this premium by
assuming risk. Of course, the risk-averse lender will pay less than $1,000 for
the $1,250 note; because both the leveragor and the lender are assuming risk,
the leveragor must pass some of the risk premium on to the lender by making
up the difference with personal funds or issuing a note for a larger amount.
However, since there is greater variance in the expected return of the
investment than in the expected return of the leveragor's debt, the lender is
exposed to less risk by buying the debt than by investing directly; the leveragor
earns a risk premium by assuming the remaining risk associated with the
investment.
40An additional cost is that, by reducing the risk of a bank deposit to that of a
government security, deposit insurance may actually set deposit risk below that for
which banks and depositors would bargain under perfect market conditions. In my
view, this is not a particularly significant cost of this form of regulation because the level
of risk to which the parties would bargain under perfect conditions is likely to be quite
low. This should be particularly true for less wealthy depositors, since demand for debt
containing the term, denomination, and collateral service features of bank deposits is
fairly inelastic, and therefore such depositors may have a large portion of their assets
invested in bank deposits. See supra note 37.
41 See supra notes 16-23 and accompanying text.
42 This could be so either because the leveragor has limited wealth and the option of
resorting to bankruptcy, because the leveragor incorporates, or because the leveragor
contracts for limited liability in some other way, such as selling non-recourse secured
debt.
43 The leveragor would actually lose more after covering the lender's collection costs
and incurring transactional expenses associated with incorporation or bankruptcy, but
this can be ignored for purposes of illustration.
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Now suppose that the government guarantees44 payment of the leveragor's
note without charging any fee for doing so.45 The leveragor can now sell a
$1,000 note for $1,000. If the proceeds are used to buy the investment, the
leveragor sees a one-third chance of owing the lender $500, a one-third chance
of receiving nothing, and a one-third chance of receiving $1,000. Thus, the
leveragor sees a risk-unadjusted expected value of $500, which has been
provided by the government gratuitously. The risk level now borne by the
leveragor represents the leveragor's share of the risk inherent in the
investment, with the government assuming the remaining risk. Since the price
of the investment is unchanged, the leveragor captures the entire risk
premium.46 There is no inherent reason that the lender should demand a higher
return on this investment than on any other risk-free investment; however, as
the supply of insured loans (that is, bank deposits) begins to exceed demand
for risk-free investments, some of the government subsidy will be passed along
to the lenders (that is, depositors).
Obviously, there is great inefficiency here. In our first example, the leveragor
was assuming risk, an activity for which risk-averse society will pay. The
leveragor compared the societal value of avoiding risk--the risk premium the
market was willing to pay the leveragor to assume that risk--with the disutility
of the risk assumption, and only engaged in the activity if the risk premium
was higher than individual disutility. Now, leveragors will engage in inefficient
risk-taking so long as the economic loss (risk premium paid minus disutility
from assuming risk) is less than the value of the government subsidy that comes
with each leveraged investment.47
44"Deposit insurance" is, economically speaking, the government guarantee of a
private debt. See U.C.C. § 3-416 (1989). The U.C.C. definition of "guarantor" perfectly
describes the role of the federal "insurer." While I am not particularly bothered by the
insurance terminology associated with this area of the law, in this article, I will
sometimes describe the role of the federal insurer as that of guarantor.
4 51n fact, this is not so different from the current system of deposit insurance: "de
jure" insurance is provided up to $100,000 per account but depositors can place funds
in multiple accounts; the definition of deposit has been broadly construed to expand de
jure insurance; "de facto" coverage of uninsured deposits has become the rule rather
than the exception; and "premiums" have traditionally been uniformly set (and probably
too low in any event). See Klausner, supra note 6, at 755; Melanie S. Tammen, The Savings
and Loan Crisis: Which Train Derailed--Deregulation or Deposit Insurance?, 6 J. L. & POL.
311 (1990).
4 6Thus, the guarantee represents a subsidy to the bank to the extent its value exceeds
the price paid for the guarantee. Economist Robert Merton has applied Black-Scholes
option pricing theory to value deposit insurance. Robert Merton, An Analytic Derivation
of the Cost of Deposit Insurance and Loan Guarantees: An Application of Modem Option
Pricing Theory, 3 J. BANKING & FIN. 3 (1977); see Fischer Black & Myron Scholes, The
Pricing of Options & Corporate Liabilities, 81 J. POL. ECON. 637 (May/June 1973).
4 7This inefficiency will lead to bank failures because the subsidy is captured by
assembling risky portfolios and keeping the profits if the upside materializes and using
limited liability to walk away if the downside materializes. For a discussion of other
factors contributing to increasing bank failures, see Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P.
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Even if the government charges a fee for its guaranty of the depositor's claim
against the institution, the problem remains so long as a single fee is charged
without regard to the riskiness of a particular institution's investment portfolio,
as has traditionally been the case with deposit insurance in the United States.48
If the bank increases the riskiness of its portfolio or decreases its capitalization,
the deposit insurance will be underpriced, and the problem will resurface.
Furthermore, the subsidy now comes not only from taxpayers via the
government but also from any institutions who choose to operate at lower
levels of risk.
Commentators on deposit insurance describe this problem as one of "moral
hazard," aptly borrowing an economic theory often applied to insurance and
insureds.4 9 Moral hazard theory posits that insurance will introduce skewed
incentives which will cause the insured to take action which increases the level
of risk on the insurer. For example, car owners with zero-deductible
comprehensive insurance may tend to leave their cars unlocked more often
than they would if they bore the risk of their cars being stolen because they will
capture all the utility from saving time but will see no cost of any theft.50 Moral
hazard is present with deposit insurance because banks which increase the
riskiness of their portfolio will capture all upside profits while bearing only
part of the downside losses: The bank's shareholders still enjoy limited
liability, and depositors will not demand an increased return because of the
Miller, America's Banking System: The Origins and Future of the Current Crisis, 69 WASH.
U. L.Q. 769 (1991).
48 See 12 U.S.C. § 1817 (1988).
49 For example, George Kaufman identifies three types of "perverse incentives from
insurance": the "moral hazard" problem of depositors who do not monitor institutional
portfolios and charge appropriate risk premiums, the resulting effect of inappropriately
low capital costs on institutional risk-taking, and the amplification of these problems
where the safety of insured accounts delays the closure and liquidation or
reorganization of failing institutions. Kaufman, supra note 10, at 23-26. See also HELEN
A. GARTEN, WHY BANK REGULATION FAILED: DESIGNING A BANK REGULATORY STRATEGY
FORTIHE 1990s 159-61 (1991); Klausner, supra note 6, at 712-13; Krishna G. Mantripragada,
Depositors as a Source of Market Discipline, 9 YALE J. ON REG. 543, 548-49 (1992); Geoffrey
P. Miller, Anatomy of a Disaster: Why Bank Regulation Failed, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 742, 750
(1992)(reviewing HELEN E. GARTEN, WHY BANK REGULATION FAILED (1991)).
50 See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 22, at 65-66. A closely related problem is "adverse
selection," wherein insurance that is uniformly priced is only purchased by poor risks
to whom it is underpriced and is not purchased by good risks to whom it is overpriced.
Id. at 66-67. Adverse selection does not really apply to deposit insurance because, at least
under current law, banks engaging in less risky activity cannot simply forego deposit
insurance coverage.
As anyone who has purchased insurance knows, insurers also use deductibles,
co-payments, variable premiums, and policy limits to counteract the problems of moral
hazard and adverse selection, and these practices are obviously instructive in designing
an effective system of deposit insurance. These and other methods of coping with moral
hazard will be considered in the next section of this article.
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presence of deposit insurance. This behavior increases the level of risk borne
by the government.
Thus, there is a real economic cost of deposit insurance, in that deposit
insurance changes the behavior of market participants such that risk is not
optimally allocated. In designing an effective system of deposit insurance the
real economic cost of deposit insurance must be contained and managed.
IV. COPING WITH THE COSTS OF DEPOSIT INSURANCE
The deposit insurance crisis 51 has stimulated considerable academic
discussion, and numerous solutions to the problems caused by deposit
insurance have been suggested and will be discussed in this section of this
article. My purpose here is not to offer completely new solutions but rather to
offer a new framework for incorporating existing proposals into a
comprehensive plan for reform. Under this framework, solutions to the moral
hazard problem caused by deposit insurance are broadly grouped under the
following theories: "hands-on," "variable premium," "market-based portfolio
monitoring," "regulatory restraint," and "segregation."
A. Hands-On Theory
Hands-on theory posits that the government, as insurer, should protect its
interests by forcing insured banks to maintain their portfolios at a given level
of risk which is appropriate to the cost of deposit insurance. Hands-on theory
lies behind current law restrictions on banking activities and organizational
structures. Whether these restrictions effectively serve hands-on theory is
debatable. 52 Hands-on theory also underlies bank capitalization 53 and
5 1See generally Symposium, supra note 2; Douglas, supra note 9; Schumer & Graham,
supra note 9.
52 Within any category of investment activity, there will be specific investments of
greatly varying risk. Moreover, such restrictions actually interfere with optimal
diversification, which is essential to avoiding wasteful risk, the assumption of which
serves no useful economic function. Modem portfolio theory distinguishes between
industry-specific or "alpha" risk and market-associated or "beta" risk. Essentially, alpha
risk can be diversified away while beta risk cannot. For example, an investment in a
company that will profit from war can be combined with an investment in a company
that will profit from peace. Thus, an investor will receive no risk premium for assuming
the risk of war because diversified investors will purchase the investment without
demanding a risk premium. However, an investor cannot diversify away the risk that
the market as a whole will rise or decline. Even after a portfolio is so diversified as to
completely eliminate alpha risk, it will tend to follow market fluctuations with swings
that are narrower than, wider than, or equal to the swings of the market. The portfolio's
level of beta risk is associated with this tendency. For a more detailed explanation, see
John Lintner, Security Prices, Risk, and Maximal Gains from Diversification, J. FIN. 587-615
(Dec. 1965); Harry M. Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, J. FIN. 77-91 (Mar. 1952); William F.
Sharpe, Capital Asset Prices: A Tteory of Market Equilibrium Under Conditions of Risk, J.
FIN. 425-42 (Sept. 1964).
53 1n an interesting variation on capital requirement theory, Klausner observes that
since the value of a bank's charter is forfeited upon insolvency and resolution, increasing
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accounting requirements, as well as the pervasive system of hands-on
regulation which the government uses to implement regulatory requirements.
Hands-on solutions, by themselves, are probably the least promising avenue
for dealing with the costs of deposit insurance. Under a pure hands-on
approach, the government is faced with the formidable task of monitoring all
aspects of all bank operations as well as the further task of assimilating the
information obtained in some meaningful way that relates to the cost at which
deposit insurance will be priced. 54 Nonetheless, hands-on theory indisputably
has some value. After all, ordinary unsecured creditors, who are similarly
situated with the government as a deposit insurer, protect themselves by
imposing contractual constraints on debtor activity and monitoring debtors
accordingly.55 Hands-on regulation is most effective as a complement to other
methods of dealing with deposit insurance moral hazard. This point will be
further developed as other solutions are examined.
B. Variable Preminm Theory
Variable premium theory borrows from "traditional" moral hazard theory,
which posits that moral hazard can be counteracted by pricing insurance
premiums differently for different insureds, depending on the risk to the
insurer which each insured presents.56 Variable premium solutions have the
added appeal of equity, since uniform premiums cause less risky banks to
subsidize riskier ones. Variable premium theory appears to be favored by
lawmakers; new legislation authorizes the development and implementation
of risk-based deposit insurance premiums. 57
While I believe that variable deposit insurance premiums are appropriate, I
am somewhat troubled by this theory's potential to be misunderstood as a
panacea which it clearly is not. Indeed, variable premium theory is really a
subtle variation of hands-on theory. Even with variable premiums, deposit
the value of the charter has the same effect as increasing the capital that shareholders
have at stake. For example, granting banks antitrust exemptions and limiting new entry
would have such an effect. Klausner reasons that if the value of bank charters are
depressed because of unsound restrictions on activity and organization, removing these
restrictions similarly increases the value of bank charters. Klausner, supra note 6, at
751-52.
54 See generally EDWARD J. KANE, THE GATHERING CRISIS IN FEDERAL DEPOSIT
INSURANCE (1985).
55 See supra note 36.
56 Other traditional methods which insurers use to counteract moral hazard are
deductibles, co-payments, and policy limits. See supra note 50. In the case of deposit
insurance, these methods should be included in the category of regulatory restraint
solutions, as will be shown in a later section of this article. See infra notes 60-67 and
accompanying text.
57FDIC Improvement Act of 1991, § 302(a), 105 Stat. 2236, 2345 (codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1817(b)); see H.R. REP. No. 330, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 109, 134-35, reprinted in 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1901,1922,1947-48.
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insurance moral hazard cannot be avoided unless the government effectively
monitors insured banks and assimilates the information obtained in a
meaningful way that relates to the pricing of deposit insurance. The only
difference between the two theories is that without variable premiums, the
government must force all bank portfolios to one uniform level of risk, while
variable premiums allow banks to operate at any level of risk (or within a
prescribed range of risk levels) so long as the government can maintain
effective data assessment and monitoring.
This difference by itself is enough to make variable premiums preferable to
uniform premiums. However, the foregoing analysis reveals that variable
premiums cannot work without being complemented by effective
implementation of hands-on regulation. This point will be repeated as we turn
to other theories for counteracting deposit insurance moral hazard.
C. Market-Based Portfolio Monitoring Theory
Market-based portfolio monitoring theory posits that securities markets can
more efficiently evaluate the riskiness of a bank's portfolio than can the
government through hands-on regulation. This theory calls for a requirement
that all banks over a given size be required to issue publicly traded long-term
debt. The federal insurer would then extrapolate the riskiness of the bank's
portfolio and the portfolio's corresponding deposit insurance premium from
the market prices at which the bank's debt trades. Premiums for smaller banks
would be established either by comparison to large banks subject to the
debt-issue requirement or through traditional hands-on regulation.5
8
The underlying principles of the market-based portfolio monitoring theory
are completely sound because of the general consensus as to the efficiency of
securities markets with active trading by large numbers of sophisticated
participants, and the high-technology speed with which the actions of those
participants are now reflected in the market. The role of market-based portfolio
monitoring in a comprehensive proposal for deposit insurance reform is
circumscribed not by any theoretical defect, but rather by a proper
understanding of exactly what it is that market-based portfolio monitoring
achieves.
Since market-based portfolio monitoring is limited to those banks for which
a public debt issue is feasible, such monitoring divides the banking industry
58Scott, supra note 25, at 916, 926. A related concept is suggested by recent legislation
which authorizes studying the feasibility of reinsuring some portion of federal deposit
insurance privately and pricing federal deposit insurance by evaluating the premiums
which the private reinsurers charge. FDIC Improvement Act of 1991, § 302(a), 105 Stat.
2236, 2345 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1817(b)(1)(B)). This proposal assumes that the
insurance industry can more efficiently assess the riskiness of bank portfolios than can
government bureaucracy. This assumption may be valid, but I consider it considerably
more controversial than the efficiency of modern, technology-driven securities markets.
Thus, I consider market-based monitoring driven by publicly traded bank debt more
promising than the reinsurance proposal.
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into two spheres: one in which the debt-issue requirement is imposed (large
banks), and one in which it is not (small banks).
Market-based portfolio monitoring (like variable premiums, which are of
course required to implement market-based monitoring) is essentially a
variation of hands-on theory with respect to large banks. This theory does not
question the need for effective hands-on regulation; rather, it proposes a
modem, high-technology approach to achieving precisely that goal. Moreover,
some of the traditional aspects of hands-on regulation remain since the federal
insurer must still enforce the debt issue requirement, collect the resulting data,
and assimilate it in a meaningful way that relates to the pricing of deposit
insurance. Indeed, market-based portfolio monitoring is not incompatible with
other aspects of traditional hands-on regulation (such as prohibiting portfolio
investments which are deemed too risky and imposing capitalization and
accounting requirements), which could be used to contain bank portfolios
within a prescribed range of risk levels, while debt-issue monitoring is used in
the final stage of pricing deposit insurance.
Market-based portfolio monitoring is a variation of regulatory restraint
theory with respect to small banks. Deposit insurance for small banks would
be priced without the use of a debt-issue requirement, but the dollar value of
deposits for which insurance is so priced would be smaller than is presently
the case (because only deposit insurance for small banks would be so priced).
Regulatory restraint theory and its premises are discussed in the next section
of this article.
Thus, the proper role of market-based portfolio monitoring is as a
component of a comprehensive proposal for deposit insurance reform.
Market-based portfolio monitoring can be used with variable premiums to
improve the quality of hands-on regulation. Effective, "traditional" hands-on
regulation is still required to implement market-based monitoring 59 and to
price deposit insurance for banks whose portfolios are not so monitored.
Regulatory restraint theory must still be explored since the possibility of
regulatory error is not completely eliminated.
D. Regulatory Restraint Theory
Regulatory restraint theory, in its most extreme form, would posit that there
should be no deposit insurance because the moral hazard costs of deposit
insurance exceeds its benefits. Having discussed this issue earlier in this article,
my focus here is on less extreme forms of regulatory restraint theory which do
59 Both the market-based monitoring and reinsurance proposals, by focusing on the
efficiency with which markets, insurers, or the government evaluate information, tend
to overlook the government's superior ability to gather information on bank portfolios
in the first place, using force of law if necessary. This creates a need to retain traditional
hands-on regulatory methods for gathering information on bank portfolios, and for
disseminating this information.
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not call for the complete elimination of deposit insurance.6 Regulatory
restraint theory can justify such proposals as reducing the scope of deposit
insurance coverage, interpreting existing coverage limits more strictly, and
allowing depositors to choose between insured and uninsured deposits.
There has been some degree of failure to recognize regulatory restraint
solutions as such. In particular, some commentators have suggested that since
insurers manage moral hazard by imposing co-payments, deductibles, and
policy limits on insureds, deposit insurance moral hazard can be managed by
similarly limiting the coverage of deposit insurance.61 Of course, the analogy
is not perfect. With traditional insurance the insured, who is subject to the
deductible, co-payment, or policy limit, is the source of risk, and such coverage
limits can therefore be expected to contain the insurer's risk exposure. In
contrast, the source of risk to the federal deposit insurer is the bank's portfolio,
not the depositor subject to coverage limitations.62 Thus, deposit insurance
coverage limits can only work by inducing depositors to monitor banks.
Indeed, proponents of coverage limits generally recognize this point, and
forthrightly argue that increased depositor monitoring can help solve the
deposit insurance crisis.6 3 Increased depositor monitoring, however, is not an
effective approach to dealing with the problems of deposit insurance. The
inability of depositors to effectively monitor banks is the justification for
deposit insurance and for other components of bank regulation in the first
place. If depositors can effectively monitor banks, then the justification for
regulation is seriously undermined. Conversely, if deposit insurance or other
regulation is necessary, then depositors should not be relied upon to monitor
banks.
Nonetheless, I believe that coverage limits have some viability under a
regulatory restraint theory. The discussion of each theory in this article shows
that it cannot be effectively implemented without some degree of hands-on
regulation, and the discussion of hands-on theory posits that hands-on
regulation cannot be perfect. Therefore, if deposit insurance will inevitably
have some regulatory error costs that will vary with the scope of deposit
6 0 0ne concern of some commentators is that elimination of deposit insurance may
not be politically feasible, regardless of the merits of doing so. See, e.g., Scott, supra note
25, at 911.
61Mantripragada, supra note 49; Klausner, supra note 6, at 753-58.
62 This is one point on which the proper characterization of deposit insurance as a
guarantee, rather than insurance, is important. See supra note 44. Apart from its ability
to capture additional subsidy, the bank is not affected by coverage limitations because
it always has to pay the depositor if solvent. If the scope of deposit insurance becomes
relevant at all, the bank is by definition judgment-proof.
63 See Mantripragada, supra note 49; Klausner, supra note 6, at 753-58. Interestingly,
other commentators are less concerned with the ability of depositors to monitor
institutions than the ability of capital markets to force bank managers to respond to
depositor discipline. See GARTEN, supra note 49, at 154-55; Miller, supra note 49, at 748-49.
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insurance coverage, 64 it is reasonable to limit the scope of deposit insurance
coverage even while implementing strategies for dealing with moral hazard.
Thus, there is some viability to regulatory restraint theory properly
understood as such. In particular, it may be advisable to reduce the $100,000
limit on deposit insurance, and to reduce or eliminate multiple account
coverage, pass-through coverage, brokered deposit coverage, and "de facto"
coverage.65 Indeed, regulatory restraint theory may be gaining legislative
support, as Congress has already taken limited steps to curb brokered deposit,
pass-through, and-de facto coverage.66
64 Here, the distinction between costs associated with implementing deposit
insurance and costs associated with the regulatory imperfections of deposit insurance
becomes relevant. The costs of implementing deposit insurance may be largely
administrative, so that such costs would not necessarily increase proportionally to the
dollar value of total insured deposits. On the other hand, costs associated with
regulatory imperfections are costs resulting from the fact that the government will never
be able to perfectly prevent all banks from maintaining portfolios for which deposit
insurance is underpriced. This cost will increase proportionally to the dollar value of
insured deposits, taking into account coverage limitations.
6 5Each of these terms describes a slightly different example of an overall tendency
of the federal insurer to extend deposit coverage beyond the stated limit of $100,000 per
depositor. Multiple account coverage allows depositors to gain $100,000 coverage for
more than one account in two ways: opening accounts at other banks, or opening
accounts at the same bank in another capacity or name (individual, joint, fiduciary, etc.).
12 U.S.C. § 1813(m)(1) (Supp. 11989); 12 C.F.R. § 330 (1991). Pass-through coverage
allows pension plans to obtain coverage up to $100,000 per beneficiary. Brokered deposit
coverage is a type of pass-through coverage which allows deposit brokers to place pools
of investor funds in hundreds of different institutions; theoretically, a single investor
could obtain coverage for billions of dollars using this technique. "De facto" coverage is
coverage for depositors who, by law, are not insured at all. This typically happens when
an insolvent bank is considered "too big to fail"; the federal insurer injects enough assets
into the institution to cover insured and uninsured deposits and locates an acquirer for
the bank in a "purchase and assumption" transaction. For a general discussion of these
points, see Klausner, supra note 6, at 706-07; Tammen, supra note 45. For an interesting
discussion of unconventional "assets" which the federal insurer can use to effect a
purchase and assumption transaction, see Kane, supra note 54, at 54.
66FDIC Improvement Act of 1991, §§ 141, 301, 311, 105 Stat. 2236, 2273, 2343, 2363(codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1821(a)(8), 1823(c), 18310; see H.R. REP. No. 330, 102d Cong.,
1st Sess. 104-05,109-110,123-25,134,137-39, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1901,1917-18,
1922-23,1936-38,1947,1950-52. In general, pass-through and brokered deposit coverage
are limited to banks which are not "troubled," defined by reference to capital
requirements; de facto coverage is still permitted in purchase and assumption
transactions but the use of purchase and assumption is limited under least-cost
resolution rules.
Somewhere between the realms of hands-on theory and regulatory restraint, and
closely related to the problem of de facto coverage, is the proposition that when a bank
failure occurs, the federal insurer should protect its interests by closing the institution
and resolving the insurer's liability in the least costly manner. Besides elimination of de
facto coverage, closing failed institutions promptly and at the lowest cost serves this
goal. See Kaufman, supra note 10, at 25-36; Scott, supra note 25, at 921-27; FDIC
Improvement Act of 1991, §§ 131, 141, 105 Stat. 2236, 2253, 2273 (codified at 12 U.S.C.
§§ 1823(c), 1831o); H.R. REP. No. 330, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 103-05, 120-25, reprinted in
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Certain other regulatory restraint proposals are viable as well. In particular,
reduction of the $100,000 limit, while politically unpopular, is advisable. While
consumers should be free to decide for themselves what level of risk they desire
with respect to invested funds, government securities offer the same risk level
as federally insured bank deposits. These securities are not fungible with
insured deposits only because of term, denomination, and collateral services
such as check-writing privileges. Thus, deposit insurance coverage should be
set not by reference to the consumers' need for low-risk investment, but rather
by reference to the consumers' need for low-risk investment carrying the
particular term, denomination, and collateral services of bank deposits. It
would not be unreasonable to significantly reduce the $100,000 limit, perhaps
to $50,000, in the interest of reducing the regulatory costs67 of deposit
insurance.
Offering depositors a choice between insured and uninsured deposits may
also be an effective means of regulatory restraint reform. The theory developed
in this article is that depositors face information barriers in monitoring bank
portfolios and capitalization; no paternalistic theory has been developed to
posit that depositors face information barriers in determining their own desires
and preferences. An uninsured deposit option would not only serve regulatory
restraint theory by reducing the dollar value of insured accounts, but it would
also increase societal efficiency by allowing depositors to more perfectly
implement their true preferences.
In spite of the appeal of some regulatory restraint proposals, however,
regulatory restraint does nothing to address the underlying problem of deposit
insurance moral hazard. Thus, like hands-on theory, regulatory restraint theory
must be viewed as a complement to other methods of reforming deposit
insurance. In turn, as shown throughout this article, other reform methods
cannot work without effective hands-on regulation, and hands-on regulation
is effective only as a complement to other methods. In the next section of this
article, this point will be repeated with respect to segregation theory; then the
five theories will be merged into a comprehensive proposal for reforming
deposit insurance.
E. Segregation Theory
Segregation theory underlies proposals to accept insured deposits only at
separate institutions which do not accept uninsured deposits and which
maintain portfolios of government securities, or to achieve the same effect
1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1901, 1916-18, 1933-38. Kaufman proposes a prompt closure
approach in conjunction with regulatory efforts to channel bank portfolios into
marketable securities so that portfolio performance can be monitored and prompt
closure enforced. For problems with such portfolio requirements, see infra note 69. For
documentation of past regulatory failure to close failed institutions promptly and at the
lowest cost, see Klausner, supra note 6, at 760-64.
67 Here again, I refer to regulatory costs which increase proportionally to the dollar
value of insured accounts. See supra note 64.
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without actually creating separate institutions by imposing portfolio
requirements and statutory liens in favor of depositors and the federal insurer.
New government securities could be issued to avoid mismatching of term and
denomination, that is, simply by placing insured funds directly in the hands of
the government. 68 Segregation theory has considerable appeal, since it would
eliminate deposit insurance moral hazard. However, what is particularly
interesting about segregation proposals is that, by and large, there has not been
a call to nationalize the banking industry. Therefore, the segregation theory
proposal that I offer distinguishes segregation as such from complete
nationalization, but views the two as components of a single theory.
On examination, segregation does prove to be different from nationalization.
As this article has shown, bank deposits are not fungible with government
securities because of term, denomination, and collateral services. Segregation
and nationalization are indistinguishable in their approach to differences of
term and denomination, but segregation leaves collateral services in the private
sector while nationalization does not. Additionally, segregation enlists the aid
of the private sector in administering bank operations.
Whether segregation is preferable to nationalization will never be a point of
universal consensus. The role of the private sector under segregation will
appeal to those who believe the private sector is inherently more efficient than
government bureaucracy; others will be skeptical of this proposition or will
simply feel that segregation so nearly approaches nationalization that it may
be more efficient to have the government provide collateral services and
administer operations once it is already so heavily involved in the banking
business.
Segregation and nationalization still present opportunities for regulatory
error if implemented in such a way that deposited funds are channeled into the
same types of investments that presently comprise bank portfolios. If the
government does this through lending institutions, segregation or
nationalization has not achieved anything at all: The government is still
exposed to the risk of the lending institution's portfolio and the entire
arrangement is indistinguishable from the unreformed deposit insurance
system now in place. If the government makes such loans and other
investments directly, then problems of credit assessment and market condition
evaluations will replace the current problems of bank portfolio monitoring.69
68 Scott, supra note 25, at 929. Scott suggests requiring banks which accept insured
deposits to invest those deposits in government securities, with a statutory lien in favor
of the depositor and federal insurer. He also suggests that deposit insurance, nominally
priced to cover administrative costs, could be continued if politically necessary. Id. at
921-23, 928-31.
69 Viewing only the government's interest in protecting its fisc, these problems could
be solved by channeling insured funds solely into readily marketable securities. The
problem with this approach is that it might not optimally allocate deposited funds, since
at least under regulated, imperfect conditions, bank portfolios have traditionally
consisted of commercial and real estate loans. I consider marketable security portfolio
proposals to be more compatible with the "safekeeping" view of segregated or
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In this case, segregation or nationalization must be premised on a belief that
the government could directly enter the banking business, including bank
lending activities, more effectively than it can presently monitor bank
portfolios. If this is true, then segregation or nationalization will require sound
regulatory management which will be functionally similar to the effective
hands-on regulation required under approaches to deposit insurance reform.
Further, regulatory restraint theory will continue to have viability since
reduction of the dollar value of insured accounts will reduce the extent to which
the government is in the banking business (uninsured accounts being accepted
by traditional private sector banking concerns).
On the other hand, deposited funds might not be rechanneled into these
types of investments. This would be consistent with the theory developed in
this article70 and seemingly reflected in the present deposit insurance scheme,
that is, if the role of banks is to transfer all risk to shareholders and leave none
with depositors, then depositors are essentially looking for institutions which
specialize in the safekeeping of funds and offer collateral services. In this case,
regulatory restraint approaches, and in particular an uninsured deposit option,
will be necessary to prevent the unnecessary removal of funds from markets
in which bank portfolios presently participate.
Therefore, segregation theory, including the option of nationalizing the
banking industry, is properly seen as an alternative to variable premiums and
market-based portfolio monitoring, with effective hands-on regulation and
appropriate regulatory restraints still required for effective implementation.
With the observations thus developed in this part of the article, all of the above
theories can now be integrated into a comprehensive approach to deposit
insurance reform.
V. CONCLUSION: A COMPREHENSIVE PROPOSAL FOR REFORM
As the preceding part of this article has shown, segregation or
nationalization of the banking industry obviates the need to reform the deposit
insurance system in its present form (although it does not obviate the need for
effective bank regulation). Thus, designers of deposit insurance reform are
faced with two mutually exclusive alternatives: retaining the overall
architecture of the existing deposit insurance system, or abandoning that
architecture in favor of segregating or nationalizing banks which accept
insured deposits.
My proposal for deposit insurance reform first calls for a political choice
between these two alternatives. I consciously use the term "political" because
nationalized banks discussed below, under which insured deposit funds would be
consciously removed from traditional banking markets, which would be served by
banks accepting uninsured deposits.
7 OSee supra text accompanying note 14.
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the magnitude of the deposit insurance crisis71 and the urgent need for reform
have become such that the political process reasonably expects to participate
in the reform process, is entitled to do so, and has in fact already begun its active
participation. 72 I view this choice as properly a political one on which a general
consensus must be achieved, based on an understanding of the tools available
to regulators for effectively implementing either choice. For this reason, I offer
my thoughts on the best means of implementing either choice.
If the present system of deposit insurance is retained, market-based portfolio
monitoring should be combined with variable, risk-based deposit insurance
premiums. This approach serves to draw on technology-driven securities
markets to properly price deposit insurance in order to effectively implement,
in a modem method, the hands-on regulation required to counteract deposit
insurance moral hazard. Effective, "traditional" hands-on regulation is still
necessary to obtain portfolio information and to disseminate the information
in securities markets, to assess market-based data on bank portfolios and
translate that data into specific deposit insurance pricing decisions, and to
monitor banks which are too small for market-based monitoring. Traditional
hands-on regulation may also be used to force banks to operate within a
prescribed range of levels, with market-based monitoring used in the final
stage of deposit insurance pricing.
Regulatory restraint theory remains viable because hands-on regulation
continues to play an important role under this approach. This theory posits that
the possibility of regulatory error will mean that some costs of deposit
insurance will increase proportionally to the dollar value of insured accounts,
and that therefore, deposit insurance coverage should be limited. Coverage can
be eliminated by changing existing rules and practices with respect to multiple
account coverage, pass-through coverage, brokered deposit coverage, and de
facto coverage, and by striving for least-cost resolution of failed institutions.
Serious consideration should also be given to a significant reduction of the
$100,000 deposit insurance limitation, perhaps in conjunction with a public
education program relating to alternative investments in government
securities which are available where the specific term, denomination, and
collateral services of insured bank deposits is not required. Finally,
consideration should be given to allowing depositors to forego deposit
insurance if they choose.
As this article has explained, a decision to segregate or nationalize banks
which accept insured deposits without a commitment to removed deposited
funds from traditional bank investment markets must be premised on the belief
that the government can directly enter the banking industry, including bank
lending activities, more effectively than it can presently monitor bank
portfolios. The government's involvement in banking activities will call for
71Seegenerally Symposium, supra note 2, Douglas, supra note 9; Schumer & Graham,
supra note 9.
72See, e.g., FDIC Improvement Act of 1991, 105 Stat. 2236.
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effective hands-on regulation even more urgently than the proposed reformed
deposit insurance system. In turn, this will increase the possibility for
regulatory error, and thus, the need for regulatory restraint. In a system of
nationalized or segregated insured banks, even greater consideration should
be given to the coverage limitations, including uninsured account options,
suggested above, and the scope of such limitation should be even broader.
Alternatively, segregation or nationalization could be pursued in a form that
views accepting insured deposits as providing for the safekeeping of funds
with collateral services. Under this approach, regulatory restraint approaches,
including uninsured account options, remain important in preventing the
unnecessary removal of funds from markets in which bank portfolios presently
participate.
Just as the need for hands-on regulation and the ensuing possibility of
regulatory error create a need for regulatory restraint, they create a need for
some intangible regulatory element which can only be described as "good
regulation." This calls for cooperation of government, academia, and the
private sector both in designing effective deposit insurance reform and in
working towards its effective implementation. It also calls for the highest
caliber of professional regulators during the coming reform process and under
the new regime. In this spirit, the theoretical framework developed in this
article is offered as a means of understanding the underlying justifications for
deposit insurance, the moral hazard cost of such regulation, and effective
strategies for containing that cost.
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